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With the accession materialized, the Romanian foreign policy was 
given the opportunity to enter a new stage – as it allowed the country to further 
pursue its vital interests1 – although the change in legal status brought a 
structural need for the consolidation of the integration process with Western 
institutions and a certain recalibration of the country’s diplomatic perspectives2. 
However, as Romania remained under the scrutiny and conditionality of the 
European Commission – especially with respect to the implementation of the 
acquis communautaire in the fields of justice and economy – the country’s 
behavioural pattern in the post-accession period was rather an inertial 
mimicking of its pre-accession dynamics. 
In short, Bucharest did not manifest any special interest in using the 
superior institutional capacities available for the design and formulation of 
various foreign policy deliverables or in exploiting the possibility to upload its 
national preferences to Brussels foreign policy framework, and thus taking 
advantage of its newly achieved increased political influence within the EU. In 
fact, as all indigenous political actors began to exhibit a winner’s syndrome, 
trying to capitalize the electoral effects of the EU accession in order to settle 
their political disputes and achieve their political goals for the 2008 elections, 
the indigenous political system witnessed populist referenda, increased electoral 
volatility and overall political instability3. 
                                                          
1
  Octavian Milevschi, “Romania: From Brotherly Affection with Moldova to 
Disillusionment and Pragmatism”, in Marcin Kosienkowski, William Schreiber (eds.) 
Moldova: Arena of International Influences, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2012, pp. 159-
183/p. 163. 
2
  Liliana Pop, Romania’s Foreign Policy after EU Enlargement: A Country in Search of a 
Role, Institute for the Study of European Transformations - London Metropolitan 
University, 2009, p. 3. 
3
  William Crowther, Oana-Valentina Suciu, “Romania”, in Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, 
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In this context – following the initial idleness – Bucharest slowly 
evolved into a more vocal supporter of the projects and initiatives aimed at 
“intensifying EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) through tightening the Union’s 
relations with South East European and the Black Sea countries”4 while keeping 
itself anchored in its pre-accession perspectives. Moreover, during the German 
presidency of the EU Commission, Romania together with Greece and Bulgaria 
supported the creation of the Black Sea Synergy – officially launched in 2008 
within the ENP framework – an initiative for a special EU policy in the Black 
Sea region, aimed at increasing the existent cooperation, through the 
implementation of sectorial partnerships5 covering various aspects like trade, 
energy market and transportation, frozen conflicts, illegal migration, organized 
crime, weapon and drug trafficking, environmental problems6. 
Its involvement in the implementation of the Eastern dimension of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and of the Black Sea Synergy did allow 
Bucharest to integrate some national perspectives into the formulation of the 
mainstream European standpoints, but also to develop a pro-active stance in the 
design of Brussels’ involvement vis-à-vis the Black Sea countries covered by 
ENP, like Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia or Ukraine. Of note, in the 
pre-accession period, Romania’s most important contribution to the 
development of a policy model for institutional interaction was represented by 
the initiation of the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership (BSFDP) 
that took place in Bucharest in 2006 – an action aimed to diversify the regional 
cooperation framework dominated by the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC). The Forum – an expression of Romania’s endeavours to acquire a 
regulatory role in the Black Sea and to upgrade the political and security role of 
the existent institutional infrastructure7 by taking advantage of the superior 
external action capacity conferred to Bucharest by its strategic relationship with 
the US – can be conceptualized as an Americanized foreign policy deliverable 
by Bucharest, articulated as a political umbrella and aimed at allowing 
Washington to project its preferences and perspectives in the region while 
assigning Bucharest a key role in the implementation process. In practice, by 
somehow positioning Romania as a “security provider” and as a “democracy 
                                                                                                                                              
Kevin Deegan-Krause, Terje Knutsen (eds.), The Handbook of Political Change in 
Eastern Europe, Edwar Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013, pp. 369-407/p. 381. 
4   Nikolaus El. Papakostas, Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far 
So Good, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens, 2009, p. 15. 
5   Ruxandra Ivan, “Black Sea Regional Leadership in Romanian Foreign Policy Discourse”, 
in Idem (ed.), New Regionalism or No Regionalism?: Emerging Regionalism in the Black 
Sea Area, Ashgate Publishing, Surrey, 2012, p. 164. 
6
  Nikolaus El. Papakostas, Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession…cit., p. 15. 
7
  Manoli Panagiota, The Dynamics of Black Sea Subregionalism, Ashgate Publishing, 
Surrey, 2012, p. 113. 
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enhancer” in the Eastern neighbourhood8 or as “a stability exporting factor”9– 
president Băsescu aimed to find a niche in the East-West dialogue10 by 
supporting the development of a security dimension of the existent BSEC 
cooperation11 which – in practice – was just an articulated diplomatic demarche 
alluding to the limitation of Russia’s influence in the Black Sea, directed 
towards other international fora. 
Romania’s proposal for future institutionalization of Black Sea 
Regionalism, wasn’t however solitary. Bulgaria and Greece came with their 
own designs regarding the development of the cooperative framework in the 
Black Sea region, with Sofia opting for a network-of-networks institutional 
architecture, while Athens advocated an inter-institutional relationship12. 
Bulgaria’s approach – note Nikolov and Simeonov – seemed the closest with 
EU’s synergy philosophy of low level political designs and sectorial 
cooperation build upon the existent institutional infrastructure – and enjoyed the 
support of Germany, while Greece’s project was – in the same logic as 
Romania’s – articulated in order to promote the interests of another global 
player in the region, in this case Russia13.  
Nonetheless, argue Nikolov, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria’s actions 
trying to impose a cooperative structure under a big-power’s patronage, proved 
illusionary14 with the Black Sea Synergy itself being eventually partially 
replaced in 2009 by the Eastern Partnership15 a Swedish-Polish foreign policy 
model which left a lesser role for the Black Sea EU members (Bulgaria, 
Romania and Greece) than any of the previous institutional concepts. Moreover, 
unlike the Black Sea Synergy – that was tailored as an interaction platform for 
EU members in their relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Turkey – the Eastern Partnership was 
                                                          
8  Ruxandra Ivan, “Black Sea Regional Leadership…cit.”, p. 163. 
9
  Simona Soare, “The Romanian-Russian Bilateralrelationship in the Aftermath of 
Romania’s Euroatlantic Integration”, Monitor Strategic, no. 1-2, 2010, pp. 93-121/p. 100. 
10
  Tatiana Bitkova, “The Place of Romania and Russia in the Context of East-West 
Relations: Political and Cultural Aspects”, Romanian Review of Political Sciences and 
International Relations, vol.11, no. 2, 2014, pp. 44-52/p. 49 
11
  Sergiu Celac, “Romania, the Black Sea and Russia”, in David Phinnemore (ed.), The Eu and 
Romania: Great Expectations, The Federal Trust, London, UK, 2006, pp. 145-151/p. 148. 
12
  Krassimir Nikolov, “The Black Sea Cooperation and Bulgaria: Context, Concepts and 
Actors”, in Idem (ed.), Europe on the Black Sea Shore, Bulgarian European Community 
Studies Association, Sofia, 2007, p. 75. 
13
  Krassimir Nikolov, Kaloyan Simeonov, “The Effect of EU Accession on Bulgaria”, in 
Graham Avery, Anne Faber, Anne Schmidt (eds.), Enlarging the European Union: 
Effects on the New Member States and the EU, Trans European Policy Studies 
Association, Brussels, 2009, p. 84. 
14
  Ibidem, p. 76. 
15  Ruxandra Ivan, “Black Sea Regional Leadership…cit.”, p. 164. 
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articulated in the logic of centralized institutionalization and, last but not least, 
kept both Moscow and Ankara outside of its conceptual borders16. 
In this context, most projects launched within the framework of Black 
Sea Synergy, like the Black Sea Euroregion – launched in September 2008 
under the initiative of Bucharest as a “forum for cooperation among local and 
regional authorities in the Bulgarian and Romanian Black Sea area”17 – proved 
nothing but formal conceptual constructions with broad and unclear agendas 
and with a minimal potential to contribute to the development of important 
foreign policy deliverables. Some explanation for these institutional 
development failures derive – according to Weaver – from the absence of 
regional cohesion or “regionness”18 due to the wide economic, political, social 
and cultural discrepancies and complex relationships among the Black Sea 
countries and under these circumstances from the absence of any internal and 
external potential for region building19. 
Another key dimension of Romania’s foreign policy dynamics during 
this period was rooted in the deepening of the American-European rift that 
characterized the last part of president George W. Bush’s second term in 
Washington. In practice, for Bucharest – whose security and regional 
perspectives were built upon US/NATO institutional backbone – the US/EU rift 
led to a certain radicalization of its relations with some EU states an aspect 
which (arguably) temporized or delayed the achievement of some of 
Bucharest’s post-accession goals – like the strengthening of its profile within 
the EU, the accession to the Schengen zone and the removal of the regulatory 
barriers preventing the access of Romanian workforce in some Western EU 
markets (UK, Ireland, Netherlands, etc.).  
Under these circumstances – aware that a change of administration in 
Washington could affect US interests in the Black Sea Region and in the 
Greater Middle East and, subsequently, its external action capacities – 
Bucharest tried to upload and institutionalize some of its Americanized regional 
perspectives both within NATO and EU (although in the latter case, to a much 
lesser extent). Of note, the Americanization of Romania’s foreign policy – and 
especially of its security dimension – took place under the form of an 
indigenous hybridizing of an imported transatlantic policy agenda, yet not as a 
by-product of an organic paradigm shift rooted in the democratic development 
                                                          
16
  Carol Weaver, The Politics of the Black Sea Region – Eu Neighbourhood, Conflict Zone 
and Future Security Community, Ashgate Publishing, Surrey, 2013, p. 17. 
17
  Manoli Panagiota, The Dynamics of Black Sea…cit., p. 80. 
18
  Carol Weaver, The Politics of the Black Sea Region…cit., p. 20. 
19
  Mustafa Aydin, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and Integration in the Euro-
Atlantic Structures”, in Jean Dufourcq, Lionel Ponsard (eds.), The Role of the Wider 
Black Sea Area in a Future European Security Space, NATO Defense College, Rome, 
2005, pp. 31-43/p. 30. 
 
Romania’s Foreign Policy Towards the Wider Black Sea Area 








of the domestic establishment, but rather as a means to enhance Romania’s 
status with the West and especially with the US, throughout the late 1990s and 
the 2000s. Regardless of its raison d’être, the process – mainly developing 
within the conceptual infrastructure of the Romanian-US Strategic Partnership – 
eventually germinated into several functional and structural outcomes. For 
instance, an extremely visible result is represented by the prevailing 
transformative dynamics of the recurrent post-2001 National Security Strategies 
whose crux was the identification of the international terrorism as Romania’s 
main security threat for Romania and the promotion of a security paradigm 
shift, from the reactive, defensive-oriented security policy from the mid 1990s 
and early 2000s towards a rather assertive policy, based on pre-emption and 
prevention of the risks and threats, seemingly stemming from the from an 
interplay between Washington interests and security perceptions. Moreover, 
among the discernible manifestations of the Americanization of Romania’s 
foreign agenda were Bucharest’s convergent alignment with Washington in 
regard to the conceptual overstretching of the self-defence argument from the of 
UN Charter’s Article 51 (the Bush doctrine) and for the subsequent US-led 
military intervention in Iraq, the signing of the agreement that prevented the 
extradition of US soldiers and personnel to International Criminal Court in The 
Hague, the actions taken in order to add value to the American interests in in 
Europe or in the regions of the world where Washington was, at that time, 
increasing its involvement and presence, like for instance Europe’s Extended 
Neighbourhood, like the active engagement in the redefinition of a security 
dimension of the Black Sea institutionalization, the promotion of energy 
transport projects aimed to integrate the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceihan bloc into an 
European energetic security equation and the support of GUAM regionalism 
and Ukraine and NATO’s bid for MAP status within NATO. And last but not 
least, the picture is completed by Bucharest’s back up for US basing presence 
on Romanian territory, promotion of a “NATO-first” security policy perspective 
for the EU, in a period when Berlin and Paris were putting pressure on 
Washington and the North Atlantic Alliance with the strategic institutional 
designs of CFSP/ESDP, and culminating with the support for Washington’s 
decision to the set-up of a land-based version of the Standard Missile 3 anti-
ballistic interceptors on Romanian territory as a part of NATO’s Article 5 
against an illusory Iranian threat. 
In this context, the projected development, the institutionalization and 
solidification of EU’s CFSP/ESDP through the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon seemed 
to shape a window of opportunity for Bucharest as it held some undertones of 
significant changes in EU’s foreign policy perspectives, namely towards a 
global military power block able to export peace and stability beyond its 
boundaries. For Romania, which managed to promote elements of the 
indigenous political agenda through the military, economic and political support 
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of Washington, the perspective of an EU able to promote peace and stability in 
its immediate Eastern and Sothern neighbourhoods20, was therefore, extremely 
appealing. 
However, overestimating Washington’s interest in the Wider Black Sea 
Area, EU states commitments regarding an EU solidarity in matters of energy 
supply and arguably encouraged by the political collisions that swept the Union 
following the gas disruption generated by the 2006 and 2009 Russian-Ukrainian 
gas disputes – Bucharest tried to upload its (also Americanized, and visibly 
anti-Russian) energy perspective into NATO, and marginally to EU’s 
institutional framework. For instance, Romania together with Poland became 
one of the most vocal NATO members to advocate for the Alliance to assume a 
more prominent and active role in the field of energy security, a domain largely 
non-military in nature, featuring a plethora of institutional and organizational 
players and, above all, being traditionally situated under the mantle of national 
responsibility. The “Energy NATO”, which evolved into a standard mantra of 
Bucharest and Warsaw rhetoric, was eventually included into the Alliance’s key 
issues agenda especially following the 2008 Bucharest Summit, when NATO 
was given a dedicated mandate to work in the field of energy security. Under 
these circumstances, although over the years NATO’s security agenda gained 
more coherence and systematization in three major areas: “Raising strategic 
awareness of energy developments with security implications, contributing to 
the protection of critical energy infrastructure, and enhancing energy efficiency 
in the military’ and the energy security became an essential part of the 
Alliance’s ‘modern toolkit”21, NATO kept only a modest role in Wider Black 
Sea Region’s energy security matrix. Subsequently – in an effort to deprive 
Moscow from an effective tool of political leverage – Bucharest pledged for 
diversification of EU’s energy suppliers and for the establishment of a common 
energy policy and of a unitary EU body to negotiate the hydrocarbon prices 
with Kremlin, thus replacing the existent system of bilateral deals, which 
allowed Russia to exert its influence over various EU member-states. 
Bucharest’s aspirations to have EU develop a pro-active involvement in the 
Black Sea neighbourhood, “to confront Russia’s assertiveness’ or to enhance 
Brussels’ political leverage in the region arguably relied on the anticipation that 
it will be ‘rendered the main promoter” of EU’s projected interests in the 
Balkans and in the Wider Black Sea Region, allowing it to increase its 
controllability of the regional development infrastructure22. 
                                                          
20
  Carol Weaver, The Politics of the Black Sea Region…cit., p. 16. 
21
  NATO’s Energy Security Agenda - http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/NATO-
Energy-security-running-on-empty/NATO-energy-security-agenda/EN/index.htm 
[accessed, February 23, 2015] 
22
  Nikolaus El. Papakostas, Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession…cit., p. 21. 
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The most visible foreign policy vector circumscribed to Bucharest’s 
alignment and perspectives was its unconditional support for any energy-
transport projects bypassing Russia and especially for Nabucco gas transport 
pipeline that became the country’s paramount energy security design. In 
particular, although EU rhetoric assigned Nabucco a symbolic role in the 
Union’s energy policy, in practice, Brussels’ involvement and support never left 
the theoretical realm. In fact, EU’s financial involvement became reality only in 
2010, decades after the announcement of the project 23 – in a moment when the 
project was already facing risks of defaulted supply contracts – and arguably 
because Brussels had to react somehow against Russia’s decision to interrupt 
gas flows to Europe for 13 days, during its dispute with Kiev from January 
2009. 
Like many other EU projects, the establishment of a hydrocarbon 
transport corridor from the Caspian Sea to Europe triggered a complex matrix 
of collisions and interactions between hegemonic influences originating in 
Washington, Brussels or Moscow – ranging from strategic policies and ending 
with energetic rivalries and competition between various patronage-based 
hydrocarbon oligarchies and business circles keen to project their interests 
through the political infrastructure on which they exerted a dominant influence. 
In this sense, Nabucco was a paramount design – circumscribed to US strategy 
towards the Southern Caucasus (and to the interests of companies with a hidden 
power politics dimension from Washington) and an instrument aimed to 
marginalize Kremlin, to reduce Moscow’s benefits deriving from its energy 
transport monopoly and its influence “both with regards to EU and the Black 
Sea region”24 – which triggered “undisguised hostility”25 in Kremlin. Under 
these circumstances, Romanian establishment – whose rhetoric tried to portray 
Bucharest as Washington’s pivot ally in the Black Sea Region – evolved 
eventually into one of the most vocal advocates of Nabucco within EU. 
Subsequently – it became actively involved in the solidification of a support 
group for the project within EU, mainly consisting of states directly interested 
in mitigating the effects of future potential gas supply disruptions on their 
economies and/or of states openly and viscerally opposing Russia’s alleged 
coercive use of its energy policy.  
On another hand, states like Germany, Italy or France – although 
affected by the 2006 and 2009 Russian-Ukrainian crises and being forced to 
draw gas from their existing stocks in order to make up for the missing 
                                                          
23
  Katinka Barysch, Should the Nabucco Pipeline Project Be Shelved?, Centre for European 
Reform - Policy Brief, 2010, p. 1. 
24
  Nikolaus El. Papakostas, Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession…cit., p. 20. 
25
  Erkan Erdogdu, “Bypassing Russia: Nabucco Project and Its Implications for the 
European Gas Security”, University of Munich, MPRA Paper No. 26793, 2010, p. 11. 
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imported volumes26 – weren’t at all alarmed by EU’s reliance on Russian 
hydrocarbons. Neither were the ‘Russian-friendly’ states like Greece, Spain or 
Bulgaria. The lack of political will in some European capitals and – in some 
cases – even open opposition to Nabucco27 were tributary to a series of 
processes among which Gazpromization28 of the indigenous economies, 
Schroederization29 of the domestic political elites30 and the “raw deals” offered 
by Kremlin to some governments at the negotiation table31 directly or through 
indigenous energy holdings, played the most important role. In addition, in 
some particular cases, the opposition derived from the refusal of several states 
to allow Ankara exert its control over an alternative hydrocarbon transport 
pipeline, due to fears that Turkey could use its important leverage potential 
during its EU accession negotiations. In short, whether personal or group 
                                                          
26
  Alain Guillemoles, “Les Leçons De La ‘Guerre Du Gaz”, Politique Internationale, vol. 1, 
no. 123, 2009, p. 446, http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/read2.php?id_revue= 
123&id=805&searc h=&content=texte, [accessed January 13, 2014]. 
27
  Erkan Erdogdu, “Bypassing Russia…cit.”, p. 17. 
28
  Gazpromization denotes a complex doctrine and behavioral dynamics employed by 
Russian Administration during Putin and Medvedev eras, with both local and externalized 
dimensions. While local Gazpromization involved an aggressive acquisition of private 
Russian assets through state owned companies and the removal of foreign companies 
from the national extraction sector, externalized Gazpromization – mentioned above – is 
circumscribed to a convoluted portfolio of manifestations, tributary to the place of the 
implementation and namely if within or outside Russia’s “near abroad”. In the case of EU 
states, Gazpromization mainly consists in obtaining political concessions for Moscow’s 
policies and behavioural dynamics, through the exploitation of the focus on profit 
maximization and market strengthening of the EU energy holdings with a hidden power 
politics dimension, which can exert an important influence at any level of the indigenous 
administration. In some cases, it also incorporates the acquisition by Russian entities of 
share packages at energy companies managing or owning energy infrastructure, deposits, 
port infrastructure or distribution networks. In the case of CIS states or young 
democracies Gazpromization implicates the exploitation of the target-state’s energetic 
vulnerabilities or of Moscow’s direct control of the indigenous energy infrastructure in 
order to interfere with the local politics by favouring some elites with the aim of being 
conceded or granted various economic or political benefits. The political recalibration 
process often relies on a structural atopy within the indigenous political realm (a strong 
corruption network which can be developed or adjusted and/or a strong ex-Soviet 
intelligence infrastructure which can be easily activated or resuscitated).  
29
  Schroederization is a variant of Gazpromization, implemented in Germany and with the 
potential to be implemented in other states, consists in the coopting of a key political elite 
in an important position within a Russian state-owned energy entity (or in an equation of 
energetic profit), with the aim for the elite to exert its political influence in order to 
crystalize a network of interests that would serve Moscow’s strategic interests in the 
development of a project, policy or specific foreign policy alignment.  
30
  Eduard Rudolf Roth, “The Limits of Gazpromization”, Strategic Monitor, vol. 1, no. 3-4, 
2010, pp. 71-81/p. 74. 
31
  Zeyno Baran, “Eu Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage”, The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 4, 2007, pp. 131-144/p. 133. 
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benefits, whether national prosperity and subsequent electoral effects, such 
incentives severely decreased the appetite of some Western government to 
antagonize Moscow over its energy interests in the Caspian region and, 
eventually acted as conceptual catalysts for the cartelization and collusion of EU 
energy market and, subsequently of EU energy security policy of the late 2000s. 
Several visible manifestation of the phenomenon were recorded in the 
cases of Russia’s paramount designs North Stream and South Stream which 
managed to coagulate an informal, Kremlin-led cartel of interests within the 
European Union (comprising Germany, Netherlands, France, Italy and 
Moscow’s traditional allies within EU, Bulgaria and Greece) and which led, 
more or less, to the erection of an energetic Iron Curtain on the EU territory, as 
both transit routes were designed in order to circumvent the territories of 
Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania and the Baltic States, the most vocal 
opponents of Kremlin’s approach to use Gazprom’s monopoly as an energetic 
weapon. In particular, notes Grazioli, Poland and the Baltic states went as far as 
openly accusing Berlin (Moscow’s key-advocate in the EU) that its privileged 
deal with Moscow over North Stream pipeline represents a modern variation of 
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact32 with dramatic effects for the future of the EU 
security. Subsequently, on June 23, 2007 Gazprom and ENI (Italy) signed the 
memorandum to construct South Stream pipeline – a hydrocarbon transport 
corridor from the Caspian region to Europe – and addressed invitations to 
Nabucco participants33 to join Russian-led project34, revealing the inchoate and 
volatile nature of EU’s rhetoric in regard to its energy diversification strategy and 
energy solidarity perspective in front of Moscow’s divide et impera approach. 
Moreover, in order to secure Gazprom’s monopoly on the EU market, 
Kremlin managed to secure – through its energy entities – important share 
packages of various European energy companies whose portfolio of assets and 
services included management of energy infrastructure, energy deposits, port 
infrastructure, transportation and distribution networks or other energetic 
assets35, while bound Central Asian gas producers to sell a large amount of their 
                                                          
32
  Stefano Grazioli, “L’asse Mosca-Berlino È Il Perno Del Continente”, Limes, 2008, 
http://limes.espresso.repubblica.it/2008/05/13/lasse-mosca-berlino-e-il-perno-del-continente/?p=617, 
[accessed January 13, 2014], p.111 
33
  With the exception of Romania all other participant countries In the Nabucco pipeline 
project reconsidered their strategic energy priorities and decided to take part into the 
development of South Stream transport pipeline. Left out of South Stream’s energetic 
geometry, Bucharest began negotiations to participate in the still-nascent White Stream 
project, backed by Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. 
34
  Erkan Erdogdu, “Bypassing Russia…cit.”, p. 12. 
35
  Steven Woehrel, “Russian Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries”. Congressional 
Research Service RL34261 - CRS Report for Congress of United States of America, 
Washington DC, 2009, p. 2; Eduard Rudolf Roth, “The Limits of Gazpromization”, cit., 
p. 74. 
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gas production to Gazprom36 . In particular, it is worth noting that – due to this 
modus operandi – Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft (state owned companies) 
and LUKoil (private company) began to play such active role in the 
implementation of Russia’s foreign policy, that – claims Lo – sometimes their 
importance even surpassed that of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs37. The key dimension behind the cartelization of the EU energy security 
policy derives, contrary to the Russian energetic superpower thesis38 – picturing 
a restaurationist and neo-imperialist Kremlin39 that achieves political objectives 
through its coercive or rewarding energy policy40 – from Russia’s severe 
structural, political and economic weaknesses which it was forced to conceal in 
order to secure itself the international acceptance of its ascending power 
projection in the topography of a future multipolar world41 More specifically, 
by mid 2000s, Russian energy sector reached a plateau level in oil production – 
Western Siberia fields became unable to yield the incremental production, 
recorded significant downsize in all Gazprom’s major production fields 
Urengoy, Yamburg, Medvezhye, Nadym și Pur-Tazovskoye42 and faced a 
severe increase of the domestic consumption levels. Moreover, the limited 
development of the new Sakhalin hydrocarbon fields and the insignificant 
progress recorded in the development of the extraction and transport 
infrastructure in Eastern Siberia, Far East and Arctic offshore regions forced 
Moscow to look abroad in order to compensate the shortages in oil and gas 
volumes required in order to supply its domestic and external customers. Due to 
these aspects, Kremlin was forced to operate not from the position of an 
                                                          
36
  Erkan Erdogdu, “Bypassing Russia…cit.”, p. 13. 
37
  Bobo Lo, Russia’s Crisis – What It Means for Regime Stability and Moscow’s Relations 
with the World, Centre for European Reform, London, 2009, p. 139. 
38
  Fiona Hill, Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia’s Revival, The Foreign Policy Centre, 
London, 2004, p. 1. 
39
  Vladimer Papava, Michael Tokmazishvili, “Russian Energy Politics and the EU: How 
to Change the Paradigm”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 2, 
2010, pp. 103-111/p. 104. 
40  Marshall Goldman, Putin, Power and the New Russia Petrostate, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 2; Anita Orban, Power, Energy, and the New Russian 
Imperialism, Praeger Security International, Westport CT, 2008, p. 5; Julianne Smith, The 
NATO-Russia Relationship: Defining Moment or Déjà Vu, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies and L'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Washington 
DC and Paris, 2008, p. 12; Margarita Balmaceda, Energy Dependency, Politics and 
Corruption in the Former Soviet Union: Russia's Power, Oligarch's Profits and Ukraine's 
Missing Energy Policy, 1995-2006, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 23; Peter Rutland, 
“Russia as an Energy Superpower”, New Political Economy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2008, pp. 203-
210/p. 203. 
41
  Eduard Rudolf Roth, “The Limits of Gazpromization”, cit., pp. 75-78. 
42
  Michael Gonchar, Vitali Martyniuk, Olena Prystayko, “2009 Gas Conflict and Its 
Consequences for European Energy Security”, EU-Rusia Centre Review, vol. 1, no. 9, 
2009, pp. 30-47/p. 31. 
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energetic superpower, but from a position of incertitude, generated by its dire 
hydrocarbon deficit43 and therefore constrained to strengthen its influence in the 
Caspian44 and to control Kazakh, Azerbaijani and Turkmen oil and gas 
production45 and regional export routes46 by any means. Analysed through these 
conceptual lenses, the Russian-Ukrainian energy crises of 2006 and 2009 and 
the 2008 Russian-Georgian war – regularly portrayed as manifestations of 
Moscow’s exercise of authority in its near abroad, in order to define and cement 
its spheres of influence and most of all to project its great power identity in 
order to claim a major spot within a mutating global geometry – gain a different 
weight. Ukrainian crises, for instance, were fuelled – at least partially – by 
Gazprom’s impossibility to deliver enough gas to cover the skyrocketing 
domestic and foreign demands during the anomalous cold winters of 2006 and 
2009. In particular – confronted with both technical issues (condensation) or 
quantity issues (hydrocarbon deficit and low pressure), Gazprom operates 
regular reductions of its delivery towards Europe during winters, with the 
unfriendly or cheap customers being the first ones to be targeted by the curtails. 
Moreover, placed in the hydrocarbon deficit framework, the crises 
could be linked with Kremlin’s organic need to discredit both Ukraine and 
Georgia as transit countries, to deal a serious blow to all gas transport projects 
that were circumventing its distribution network (White Stream and Nabucco) 
or, according to Fraser, to accelerate the construction of its own gas transport 
corridors North Stream and South Stream47. However, the idea that behind 
Moscow’s actions lies the need to recalibrate the profits of various groups of 
interests which control de energy companies and which had their revenues reduced 
due to the incidence of the global financial crisis48 cannot be discounted. 
Another key-point related to Russia’s energy policy is whether 
Kremlin’s strategic documents and behavioural dynamics – arguably calibrated 
with the energetic superpower thesis – and its energy-related persuasion arsenal 
are realistically dimensioned. And the answer is that Moscow’s “blackmailing” 
toolbox is extremely limited due to severe structural deficiencies. For instance, 
Moscow’s constant threats that it would reroute its gas (and oil) fluxes towards 
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China have only a rhetorical value. In practice, the absence of a distribution 
network, the lack of investment, the lack of political incentives, the 
geographical positioning of the major operational Russian gas and oil fields 
prevent the occurrence of serious mutations within the current energy equation. 
Russia’s accelerated involvement (and investment) in the development of 
Eastern Siberia and Far East energy projects – is triggered not only by 
economic, but also by security constraints. In particular, Russia is forced to 
secure an economic partnership with China, not only because the latter is 
supporting and implementing some sort of a politico-economical encirclement, 
but also in order to avoid a possible exploitation by Beijing of Russia’s 
economic and demographic vulnerability in its Far East Region and provinces, 
where - according to the Japan’s Institute for Research Development – live only 
7.2 million permanent residents, most of them of oriental cultural and genetic 
heritage – and where the secessionist trend – labelled as a “threat to the 
national security” by ex-president Putin49 (seems to have been galvanized by 
the eruption of the international crisis50.  
Under these circumstances, Romanian-Russian relations evolved as an 
asymmetrical by-product of the structural mutations and overlapping patterns of 
interests that shaped the topography of the region, especially in a Brussels-
Washington-Moscow triad of divergences and, to a certain extent, of the 
common denominator binding various energy groups with a high politics 
agenda from Russia, EU and US. In particular, the deterioration of the political 
relations between Kremlin and the White House allowed Romania to exhibit its 
superior external action potential conferred by US’s support for its policies and 
perspectives – yet without any of its endeavours, projects and initiatives (Black 
Sea Forum, Nabucco hydrocarbon transport pipeline, the internationalization of 
the ‘frozen conflicts’ neighbouring the Black Sea, etc.) – being able to evolve 
into a fully fledged foreign policy deliverable and thus to lead to the 
marginalization and the diminishing of Moscow’s influence in the region or to 
the transformation of Romania into a regulating player in the Wider Black Sea 
Area. In response, Moscow boycotted all Romanian initiatives aimed to reshape 
the Wider Black Sea institutional architecture and recalibrated its hydrocarbon 
prices in order to capture the deterioration of the bilateral relations. In addition, 
according to some proponents of the external subversion thesis – like for 
instance Tudoroiu (2008) – Moscow was the driving force behind the failed 
2007 parliamentary impeachment that targeted the pro-American President 
Traian Băsescu with the allegedly Kremlin-orchestrated plot being supported 
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and implemented with the help with the indigenous oligarchs due to converging 
interests between Russian and Romanian energy groups with important political 
influence51. Support for this claim – argues Tudoroiu – can be found in the fact 
that week before the vote on president’s suspension, Romanian Prime Minister 
Călin Popescu Tăriceanu – Băsescu’s arch-enemy and a figure closely 
connected with Romanian energy groups with a high politics agenda – met 
Aleksandr Kondyakov, a person allegedly well connected with the Kremlin 
administration. More or less in the same period, argues the author, Romania’s 
most important hydrocarbon oligarch and Prime Minister’s close partner and 
sponsor Dinu Patriciu issued a series of pro-Russian statements, for only shortly 
after to sell its 75% of his energy company Rompetrol to the Kazakh state-
owned KazMunai Gaz (placed, according to Tudoroiu, in Gazprom’s spheres of 
influence) in a US$ 2.7 billion deal52. Of note, although it can be reasonably 
accepted that Tudoroiu’s hypothesis cannot be completely discounted, the 
author’s attempt to explain his observation remains extremely speculative, as – 
in a later statement - even President Basescu himself admitted that Kodyakov, 
represented rather private business stakes and not Moscow’s interests53 and that 
other factors (discounted by Tudoroiu) might have played a major role in the 
process and in the unfolding of the events.  
However, the return of Băsescu to his leading foreign policy authority 
role – after the failed referendum – coincided with a gradually decreasing 
magnitude of Moscow’s antagonization in the incumbent President’s discourse, 
up to a formal normalization of the rhetoric by the spring of 200854 and with a 
rejuvenation of Bucharest’s vocal support for the arguments put forward by 
Washington for giving Georgia and Ukraine’s immediate NATO membership 
action plans55. The US proposal – backed up by the UK and the anti-Russian 
                                                          
51
  Theodor Tudoroiu, “From Spheres of Influence to Energy Wars: Russian Influence in Post-
Communist Romania”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 24, no. 3, 
2008, pp. 386-414/p. 498. 
52
  Ibidem, pp. 406-408. 
53
  Traian Băsescu, Romania Libera Newspaper, July, 23, 2012 http://www.romanialibera. 
ro/politica/institutii/interviu-rl-cu-traian-basescu--ce-crede-presedintele-suspendat-despre-
legatura-dintre-inlaturarea-sa-si-cea-de-a-doua-vizita-in-romania-a-rusului-kondyakov-
271276 [Accessed February 23, 2015] [accessed January 13, 2014]. 
54
  Ziare.com, April 4, 2008, http://www.ziare.com/basescu/presedinte/basescu-numai-lapte-
si-miere-cu-putin-281945 [accessed January 13, 2014]. 
55
  Traian Băsescu, Bursa Magazine, April 2, 2008, http://www.bursa.ro/romania-sustine-
extinderea-nato-in-balcanii-de-vest-si-in-spatiul-ex-sovietic5267&s=print&sr=articol&id_ 
articol=25267.html; [accessed January 13, 2014]; Ileana Mădălina Racheru. “Teme de 
politica externă a României. Relațiile bilaterale România-Georgia (2004-2009), Sfera 
Politicii, no. 139, 2009, http://www.sferapoliticii. ro/sfera/139/art11-racheru.html 
[accessed January 13, 2014]; Hotnews News Agency, http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-
4048492-traian-basescu-romania-sustine-acordarea-map-ului-pentru-georgia-ucraina-
reuniunea-ministrilor-externe-nato-din-decembrie.htm [accessed January 13, 2014]. 
EDUARD RUDOLF ROTH 
 
 








axis of the EU (Poland, Romania, Baltic States) – failed to be crystalized into an 
official agreement during NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, especially due to 
the lack of support of some EU states, mainly France and Germany, not eager to 
provoke Russia in any way56. 
The discernible deepening of the transatlantic rift – arguably fetishized 
to some extent by Kremlin masterminds – appeared to signal the opening of a 
window of opportunity for keeping the US at the periphery or even out of the 
Caspian power and energy topographies57 – while shaping a power architecture 
circumscribed to Kremlin’s projections, namely with EU’s benign presence in 
the West and with its own hegemonic domination in Eurasia58. In this context, 
not only that Kremlin’s behavioural dynamics hinted that US’s “influence in its 
near abroad is no longer welcomed”59, but also began to manifest pseudo-
hegemonic symptoms in order to signal the change that appeared to have 
occurred in the regional balance of power and which culminated with its actions 
during the 2008 Russian-Georgian War60. NATO and EU’s reactions of not 
expressing a firm condemnation of the Russian military intervention – although, 
nominally, Baltic States, Poland and Sweden had extremely vocal responses – 
induced the idea that Western support for Georgia was rather hollow and that 
the states situated in Russia’s neighbourhood should re-evaluate their ways of 
dealing with Kremlin in the future.  
To some extent, seen from Bucharest, Russian invasion of Georgia and 
the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were predictable collateral 
effects of US/EU’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence, perfectly 
circumscribed to Romania’s refusal rhetoric associated with its decision not to 
align itself along the same political line with Washington and Brussels over the 
Kosovo issue, a stand which – according to Bitkova – marked Bucharest’s first 
derailment from its traditional loyalty matrix towards NATO’s actions in the 
Balkans since late 1990s61. 
                                                          
56
  Carol Weaver, The Politics of the Black Sea Region…cit., p. 18. 
57
  Elkhan Nuriyev, The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Conflicts, Caspian Oil and 
Great Power Politics, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2007, p. 113. 
58
  Craig Nation, Dmitri Trenin, Russian Security Strategy under Putin: US and Russian 
Perspectives, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle PA, 2007, p. 4. 
59  Yannis Tsantoulis, “Geopolitics, (Sub)Regionalism, Discourse…cit.”, p. 29. 
60
  Of note, argue Notion and Trenin, Russia’s military intervention on Georgian territory 
shouldn’t be conceptualized as a revamping by Kremlin of former USSR’s military 
doctrine and strategic thinking, but rather as a recalibration of Moscow’s perspectives 
along the lines of the pre-World War I “ruthless strategic competition among nations”, 
which attributed the status of reasonable foreign policy tool to the use of force and more 
generally, to war. Craig Nation, Dmitri Trenin, Russian Security Strategy under 
Putin…cit., pp. 35-36. 
61
  Tatiana Bitkova, “The Place of Romania and Russia in the Context of East-West 
Relations: Political and Cultural Aspects”, Romanian Review of Political Sciences and 
International Relations, vol.11, no. 2, 2014, pp. 44-52/p. 49. 
Romania’s Foreign Policy Towards the Wider Black Sea Area 








Moreover, through the same conceptual lenses, the Russian-Georgian war had a 
relatively critical dimension: first of all, because similar uses of the Kosovo 
precedent could have been employed by Kremlin in the cases of Transnistria 
and Ukraine, situations engulfing major threats to Romania’s security and 
having the potential of dragging Bucharest in an armed conflict, and secondly 
because Russian control over South Ossetian oil hub would have undermined of 
Romania’s chances to maximize its role in the hydrocarbon transport projects 
linking the Caspian Region with Europe. In the case of a de jure secession of 
the breakaway Georgian province, noted Papakostas, the “flow of oil resources 
that would enter In the European mainland through Romanian ground” would 
have been interrupted62. In this context, not only that Romania has sent the 
biggest team of observers in the EU Civil Monitoring Mission in Georgia63, but 
it indulged Brussels to “acquire a more proactive role in the peacekeeping and 
peace building processes” in the frozen-conflicts bordering the Black Sea64 and 
became one of the main advocates of granting MAP status to Tbilisi, at the 
Lisbon 2010 NATO Summit.  
Moreover, aware of the high political barriers standing in the way of 
Nabucco’s future, Romanian administration focused on the development of a 
less ambitious, yet easier to be implemented energy project – the AGRI 
interconnector – a transport solution for supplying liquefied Azeri gas from Georgian 
port of Kulevi to Romanian port of Constanta. In this sense, at the end of a year 
of year of trilateral negotiations, Tbilisi, Baku and Bucharest signed in 2010 a 
memorandum that aimed at attaining the necessary framework for the project. 
Romania’s behavioural dynamics towards Wider Black Sea Area, the 
constant diatribes against Russia’s energy practices (especially in the discourse 
of Romanian President Traian Basescu) and of a higher importance, Bucharest’s 
successful attempt in involving Western structures in the management of 
Moldova’s social, political, economic and security problems, generated 
significant concerns in Moscow65 and triggered a series of reactions from 
Kremlin, especially through economic gestures66, under the form of retaliatory, 
coercive prices for Gazprom’s exports to Romania. Under these circumstances, 
the end of the 2000s would find the two states in a complete standstill67. 
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Brussels’ low appetence for hard foreign policy approaches and the 
apparent lack of impetus in challenging Russia over its energy and military 
monopoly in the Black Sea Region, left Romania in the same foreign policy 
stance as in the pre-accession period and namely looking towards Washington 
in order to consolidate its security and achieve its foreign policy outcomes. As a 
result, in February 2010 – Romania announced that it will host components of 
Washington’s anti-ballistic missile system (ABMS) or “missile shield” in 
Central and Eastern Europe68 a decision that made the relations with Russia take 
“another turn towards the inimical”69.  
Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and Kremlin’s continuous 
destabilization of Kiev’s authority, sovereignty and territorial integrity – which 
arguably occurred in context characterized by a rather gradual shrinking of 
EU’s security commitments towards the region – found Romania in a relatively 
complex situation. On one hand, with Washington taking the lead against 
Moscow over its actions in Ukraine – within a North Atlantic institutional frame 
marked by normative collisions and political divisions regarding NATO’s 
reactions towards Kremlin – Bucharest made a stand for superior military 
capabilities to be deployed on its territory in order to ensure its security70 while, 
on another tried to use EU’s institutional capabilities in order to prevent the 
contagion of the Ukraine crisis in Moldova (a state which Bucharest aims to 
keep within its spheres of influence). Moreover, despite the establishment’s 
mild rhetoric against a Russian “aggression” and “destabilization”71, passing the 
redline of international law72, Bucharest’s behavioural patterns reveal the 
adoption of a strategy of avoidance and buck-passing, in which the – arguably 
theoretical – burden of confronting Kremlin was passed to Washington and 
Brussels73, yet aware that whatever modest US in the region and EU’s 
conceptual support for Ukraine won’t justify a confrontation with Moscow in its 
“near abroad”, a region of vital interest for Russia.  
 
                                                          
68
  Carol Weaver, The Politics of the Black Sea Region…cit., p. 18. 
69
  Simona Soare, “Still Talking Past Each Other…cit.”, pp. 14-18/p. 15. 
70
  Agence France Press, News Agency Report ‒ Romania Presses for NATO Redeployment 
over Ukraine Crisis, http://www.afp.com/en/news/romania-presses-nato-redeployment-
over-ukraine-crisis [accessed January 13, 2014]. 
71
  Traian Băsescu, Libertatea Newspaper, August 28, 2014, http://www.libertatea.ro/detalii 
/articol/traian-basescu-rusia-putin-ucraina-transnistria-505270.html [accessed January 13, 2014]. 
72
  Klaus Johannis, Digi 24 Television, February 6, 2015 http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/ 
Digi24/Actualitate/ Politica/Klaus+Iohannis+Rusia+a+depasit+linia+rosie [accessed 
January 13, 2014]. 
73
  Traian Băsescu, Gandul Newspaper, March 6, 2014, http://www.gandul.info/ 
politica/criza-din-ucraina-in-consiliul-european-basescu-ceea-ce-a-facut-federatia-rusa-
este-o-agresiune-daca-se-decide-un-format-de-negociere-romania-trebuie-sa-fie-parte-
12207632 [accessed January 13, 2014]. 
Romania’s Foreign Policy Towards the Wider Black Sea Area 











The primary conclusion of this analytical rendition of Romania’s 
foreign policy dynamics towards the Wider Black Sea Area in the period 2007-
2010 is that a large part of Bucharest’s portfolio of foreign policy deliverables 
and paramount designs engulfing the region – like the securitization of a 
regulatory role for itself in the Black Sea area, the increase of its control over 
the regional development infrastructure, the development of a security 
cooperation dimension within the existent cooperation framework and the 
development of a hydrocarbon transport corridor from the Caspian to Europe 
bypassing Russia – were, in fact, by-products generated by a divergent interplay 
of exogenously articulated influences (primarily of US and Russian and 
secondary of EU origins) and by the subsequent projections of Washington’s 
(and to a lesser extent, Brussels’) heterochthonous regional perspectives, 
preferences and interests, which Bucharest transposed into its foreign policy agenda, 
with the anticipation that it would be rendered the main promoter or implementer. 
The indigenous hybridizing of an imported (mostly) transatlantic and 
European policy agendas for the Wider Black Sea Area wasn’t however 
tributary to an organic development and transformation of the post-Communist 
Romanian political and economic spectra, but rather as a incidental side effect 
of the recurrent autochthonous establishments’ attempts to enhance the 
country’s status and allure in the West, during a timeframe when the US and 
EU seemed to manifest an apparent interest in the region. 
Cartelization of EU’s energy policy, colliding interests between 
patronage-based hydrocarbon oligarchies and business circles with high 
political agendas, Russia’s hydrocarbon deficit, the overestimation of 
Washington’s and Brussels’ interests in the Wider Black Sea Area and the 
arguably illusory perspective regarding member states commitments to support 
a EU-wide energy solidarity, were the utmost factors that affected Bucharest’s 
foreign policy and triggered substantial mutations in its behavioural dynamics 
towards the region.  
Moreover, in the post-accession period, when Bucharest eventually 
began to use the superior institutional capacities for foreign policy design and 
formulation, it started to upload its previously-constructed Americanized 
foreign policy perspectives regarding the Wider Black Sea Area into EU’s 
institutional framework. In particular, with EU (especially France and 
Germany) manifesting both a lack of appetite for hard foreign policy 
approaches and a lack of motivation, of political and o institutional impetus for 
challenging Russia’s regional or energy hegemony, Romania’s endeavours led 
to extremely modest results and, to some extent, to the isolation of Bucharest 
(and of other actors with similar agendas) at the periphery of Brussels’ foreign 
policy profile.  
